The Clinton Parameters

The challenge

The Camp David summit ended in July 2000 without an agreement¹. On 28 September riots broke out that developed into the Second Intifada, and the violence was still going on when Clinton made his proposal².

According to Clinton, he put forward his ideas only after both sides asked him to, when the talks had stalled³. Summing up, he described what each side stood to gain: the Palestinians — sovereignty, a viable state and a capital in Jerusalem; the Israelis — an end to the conflict, security, and about 80% of the settlers inside Israel⁴.

The road there

1. 25 July 2000The Camp David summit ends without an agreement¹.
2. 23 December 2000Clinton presents the parameters orally, at the White House, to the two negotiating teams⁴⁵.
3. 1 January 2001The Palestinian negotiating team, headed by Yasser Abed Rabbo, issues a document of reservations and questions⁶.
4. 3 January 2001The White House announces that Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak have accepted the parameters, each with reservations⁷.
5. 7 January 2001Clinton sets out the main lines of the outline in public, in a speech in New York³.
6. January 2001The Taba talks are held on the basis of the parameters and end without an agreement⁵.

The people

Led

Ehud Barak · Yasser Arafat

Negotiated

Yasser Abed Rabbo

Proposed

Bill Clinton

What was proposed

• Territory: a Palestinian state on 94%–96% of the West Bank, compensated by a land swap of 1%–3%. Settlement blocs that are home to about 80% of the settlers would be annexed to Israel⁵⁴.
• Jerusalem: Arab neighbourhoods to the Palestinians and Jewish neighbourhoods to Israel, including in the Old City. For the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif two formulations were offered; in both, Palestinian sovereignty over the compound and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall⁴.
• Refugees: the solution would centre on the Palestinian state⁵. Five possible destinations were listed: the Palestinian state, areas transferred to it from Israel in the land swap, rehabilitation in the host countries, resettlement in third countries, and admission to Israel. The last three would depend on the policy of the receiving country⁴.
• Security: an international force; an Israeli presence at fixed locations in the Jordan Valley for 36 months, under the authority of the international force; three Israeli early-warning stations in the West Bank; and a Palestinian state without an army, with its own security forces⁴⁵.
• End of conflict: the agreement would mark the end of the conflict, and its implementation would end all claims; this would be anchored in a Security Council resolution⁴⁵.

Read the document

The geography

The hard decisions

• No written text was handed over. Clinton presented the ideas orally, and the familiar text is based on versions published by the newspaper Haaretz and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC)⁴.
• The Palestinian reservations: in a document dated 1 January 2001 the negotiating team wrote that annexing the blocs would damage territorial contiguity and could split the state into three cantons, that the division in Jerusalem would create disconnected Palestinian islands, that there is no precedent for a people giving up the right of return, and that one year was enough for the withdrawal. The team asked for clarifications and maps⁶.
• The Israeli reservations: the White House said that Barak too had accepted the parameters with reservations and needed to consult his cabinet. The statement did not spell out what the reservations were⁷.
• Time pressure: Clinton made clear that these were his own ideas and that, if they were not accepted, they would come off the table and leave office with him⁴.

Where accounts differ

According to The White House, January 2001

Both sides accepted the parameters, each with reservations, and that is a step forward. The spokesman declined to compare the weight of each side's reservations⁷.

According to The Palestinian negotiating team

The proposal as presented does not guarantee a viable state, and is too vague to serve as the basis for an agreement without clarifications and maps. The team asked for clarifications and did not announce a rejection⁶.

According to Dennis Ross, the US envoy

The parameters went far beyond what was put forward at Camp David, and Arafat proved unable to accept them; in doing so he convinced the Israeli public that he could not accept any ideas for resolving the conflict⁸.

According to Hussein Agha and Robert Malley

Ross's account obscures the progress that was made: the vital interests of the two sides can be reconciled, and a deal was within reach. The two sides' responses should be understood in the light of the context and of the mistakes made by everyone involved⁸.

What remains open

• The parameters set percentage ranges but included no map, and the Palestinian side argued that the proposal could not be assessed without maps⁶.
• Two questions were left without an agreed wording: the right of return — Clinton himself offered two alternative formulations — and the arrangement on the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif⁴.
• The parameters remained a reference point even after they came off the table: according to the ECF database, the Geneva Initiative of 2003 draws on them⁵.